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Introduction
Japan’s stakeholder capitalism, which emphasises employment stability (long-term or ‘lifetime 
employment’ for regular workers), has been in dire straits since the mid-1990s. Hatarakikata 
Kaikaku or ‘labour reforms’, which tackle three labour issues – excessively long working hours, 
significant wage and treatment disparities between regular and non-regular workers, and labour 
shortages – have been a major policy agenda for Japan’s Abe administration since August 2016. 
The number of non-regular workers (low-waged, easily dischargeable labour) doubled from 
9.7 million in 1994 to 20.4 million in 2017, while regular workers decreased from 38.1 million 
to 34.2 million. Consequently, according to the Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions 
by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), the average household income in 
Japan fell from ¥6.64 million in 1994 to ¥5.60 million in 2016, which epitomises the ‘lost two 
decades’.  
     Many scholars (for instance, Imai 2011; Watanabe 2012; Shibata 2015) claim that 
deregulation or neoliberal reform of the Japanese labour market has caused these phenomena. 
Some scholars (Okada 2009; Hasegawa 2011) further argue that neoliberal reform has been 
driven by Nippon Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation, hereafter Keidanren), the largest 
industrial association (business lobbying group) in Japan. In contrast, other scholars (Keizer 
2010; Yun 2015) claim that Keidanren has continuously supported the practice of lifetime 
employment but used a low-waged non-regular workforce in order to reduce personnel costs 
and protect existing regular workers. I share the latter perspective and contend that most 
scholars have failed to indicate that from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s, neoliberal thought 
was promoted by Keizai Doyukai (the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, hereafter 
Doyukai), another major industrial association, but that Japanese society has resisted 
neoliberalism, an ideology that emphasises market efficiency and economic liberalisation. My 
research puzzle here is why Japan has resisted American neoliberal hegemony, which advances 
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the convergence to American-style shareholder capitalism promoting higher international 
capital mobility and capital markets, and how the resistance has resulted in the rapid increase 
in the working poor. This article focuses on the conflict between Japanese-style stakeholder 
capitalism and American-style shareholder capitalism, which are based on different social 
norms, in the Japanese political economy since the 1990s.
     The combination of liberal international trade and restricted international capital mobility 
during the Cold War was conducive for Japanese-style stakeholder capitalism based on the 
combination of the economic bureaucracy’s administrative guidance (non-legally binding but 
highly influential recommendation), long-term focused corporate management, committed 
labour, patient capital and keiretsu (interlocking business relations), often described as ‘convoy 
capitalism’. As Japan was a bulwark against communism, the United States provided Japan 
with extensive support, including accommodative trade policy, the dollar-yen exchange rate 
very favourable for Japanese exporters (US$1 = ¥360) and generous technology transfer. 
However, Japan’s strategic importance for the United States was lessened, and the United 
States increasingly showed less tolerance towards the closed nature of the Japanese market in 
the 1980s. Since then, neoliberalism led by the United States has been an external pressure on 
Japan to change its form of capitalism. In the 1990s, Japanese-style stakeholder capitalism 
faced significant adversity, such as the enormous bad debt problem, the economic slump and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) wining and dining scandals.1 An increasing number of market 
liberals in the parliament, bureaucracy, and business community tried to transform the Japanese 
economic system by introducing American-style financial and business practices under the 
Hashimoto (1996-8) and Koizumi (2001-6) administrations. 
     However, Japan has resisted neoliberalism, which legitimises shareholder primacy, and the 
influence of market liberals in Japan has weakened since 2006. Neoliberalism advocates free 
capital mobility between sectors, regions and countries, which suggests the restoration of 
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dominance by narrowly defined capitalists, such as major shareholders (Harvey 2005). One 
salient example of Japan’s resistance to market liberalization is the stalled financial 
disintermediation (i.e. the shift from a bank-cantered to market-based financial system) since 
the mid-2000s, despite the Japanese government’s financial deregulation during the 1980s and 
1990s. Ikeo (2003: 92-5) claims that a market-centred financial system is more efficient than a 
bank-centred financial system when the economy requires a drastic shift from low growth to 
high growth industries. However, the outstanding Japanese domestic corporate bonds 
moderately decreased from 62 trillion yen in 2000 to 60 trillion yen (11% of GDP) in 2016 –
dwarfed by bank loans for companies (roughly 400 trillion yen) – when the US proportion of 
outstanding corporate bonds to GDP was 45%. Another example is the very low proportion of 
Japan’s outstanding inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP (3.8% at the end of 2016), 
which is much smaller than those of the United States, Britain, China, and South Korea at 
35.2%, 55.7%, 24.5%, and 12.4%, respectively. In contrast, FDI in China has significantly 
contributed to its rapid economic growth. Due partly to US pressure, since the 1980s the 
Japanese government has campaigned to increase inward FDI, but the increase has been only 
incremental. Japan’s slow industrial upgrading due to the constrained capital mobility, its 
intense international competition in the manufacturing sector with emerging economies, and 
the rapid appreciation of the yen (US$1 plummeting from ¥249 in June 1985 to  ¥85 in June 
1995) have resulted in a serious strain on its labour market.
     I utilise the concept of systemic support, which has enabled Japanese society’s anti-liberal, 
anti-free market norms to resist American-style shareholder capitalism, as a solution to the 
research puzzle (Gotoh and Sinclair 2017). Since the mid-1990s, there has been an ideational 
conflict among Japanese elites between the anti-free market and market liberalisation camps. I 
particularly focus on the ideational contestation between the two major industrial associations, 
the largest, conservative Keidanren and the neoliberal-oriented Doyukai, as key ‘ideational 
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platforms’ of the respective camps. The anti-free market camp has endeavoured to preserve 
stakeholder capitalism, including job security of regular workers, whilst the market 
liberalisation camp has tried to enhance return on capital through neoliberal restructuring.
     My research puzzle is associated with the convergence-diversity debate over whether 
coordinated market economies (CMEs), including Japan, which rely on mutual cooperation 
among economic actors connected by a dense network of institutions, would converge with 
liberal market economies (LMEs), including English-speaking countries, which rely on the 
market mechanism (Hall and Soskice 2001; Laurence 2001; Yamamura and Streeck 2003; 
Schoppa 2006; Rosenbluth and Thies 2010; Vogel 2018). LMEs (or American-style 
shareholder capitalism) have become the global norm since the 1980s, and CMEs’ financial 
practices have gradually converged with those typical of LMEs. However, tensions have been 
intensified between liberal global norms and anti-liberal domestic social norms in the Japanese 
political economy since the 1990s. I contend that anti-liberal, anti-free market Japanese social 
norms have been more persistent than many scholars anticipated and have resisted convergence 
towards LMEs.
     The findings of this paper have important implications for other constrained market 
economies in Asia, where the tension between liberal global norms and anti-liberal domestic 
social norms can be witnessed whilst they clarify the characteristics of American-style 
shareholder capitalism. This paper showcases the persistence of social norms, which 
characterize specific types of capitalism.
     I first illustrate the significance of social norms and the role of industrial associations as key 
ideational platforms. Then, I discuss an ideational conflict between the two industrial 
associations, the similarity in the backlash to liberal global norms between pre-war and present-
day Japan, and the robustness of the Japanese corporate system based on systemic support and 
in-group favouritism.
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Social norms and industrial associations
Rational choice approaches are often effective in analysing cause-effect relations, but their 
weakness is that the criteria for rationality vary by country and social norms constitute the 
boundary of rationality. Constructivism, which emphasises the importance of ideas, norms, and 
identities and views rationality as a relative phenomenon, can make up for the above weakness 
of rational choice approaches. However, constructivism cannot fully answer the question of 
why certain ideas are generally accepted in a society and others are not (Bieler 2001: 94). Neo-
Gramscian perspectives shed light on which actors utilise which ideas as weapons to achieve 
their goals – ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981: 128). Neo-
Gramscian perspectives are effective for unveiling the links between Japanese social norms 
and major actors’ interests. The formula is: global hegemony (American neoliberal hegemony) 
versus counter-hegemony (Japanese social norms) and latent social class conflicts (Cox, 1981). 
The continuity of a historic bloc is underpinned by not just dominant elites’ coercion, but also 
subordinates’ consent to social norms created and disseminated by dominant elites. Neo-
Gramscian scholars claim that the power of capital stems from the relative mobility of capital 
and the relative immobility of labour (Gill and Law 1988). Capital mobility can be witnessed 
in capital market activities, mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructurings, and 
bankruptcies. Capital is often decoupled from the real economy to seek short-term profit in the 
United States. 
     In contrast to English-speaking societies where capitalists are a ruling class, anti-free market 
elites (‘administrators’), such as interventionist bureaucrats, conservative Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) politicians, and corporate executives who share similar characteristics to 
bureaucrats, are dominant in Japanese society (van Wolferen 1989; Noguchi 2010).2 
Immediately after WWII, Japan’s major capitalists, such as landlords and executives of 
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Zaibatsu conglomerates and large firms, were eliminated by US occupation forces, which 
reinforced the power of administrators. Noguchi (2010) argues that anti-free market norms and 
institutions of the ‘1940 system’ developed for total war have remained in Japanese society, 
and can be witnessed in the bureaucratic intervention, the bank-centred financial system, and 
the Japanese-style corporate system. Japanese-style stakeholder capitalism is based on a 
management-labour alliance against capitalists and interlocking business relations, supported 
by the confederation of administrators (Gotoh and Sinclair 2017). Capital mobility is 
constrained by administrators, and capital tends to be tied to specific organisations in Japan.
     In order to supplement macroscopic neo-Gramscian perspectives, I use ‘guardian and 
commercial morals’, philosophical concepts identified by Jacobs (1992), which are 
characteristic precepts of the public and private sectors, respectively. While guardians, such as 
bureaucrats, soldiers and police officers, who could also be described as administrators, mainly 
protect the territory, the commercial camp includes capitalists and entrepreneurs (Jacobs 1992: 
28-9). Guardian morals value loyalty, obedience, largesse (including support for subordinates) 
and exclusiveness to maintain stable long-term relationships among people, whereas 
commercial morals, which promote opportunistic short-term relationships, appraise fairness, 
efficiency, competition and openness (Jacobs 1992: 22-34). Although the distinction between 
collectivist and individualist societies is relative not dichotomous, collectivist societies, 
including Japan, have an orientation towards guardian morals, while individualist societies, 
such as English-speaking countries, are oriented towards commercial morals (Gotoh and 
Sinclair 2017).
     Toshio Yamagishi, a social psychologist, argues that Japanese society’s collectivist, 
parochial and risk-averse features were presumably shared by most societies during the pre-
modern period, but that some societies, especially Anglophone countries, nurtured a liberal, 
individualist and more risk-taking culture through the expansion of commerce.3 Yamagishi and 
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Yamagishi’s survey (1994), which had 1136 Japanese and 501 American respondents, and 
subsequent empirical research (Cook et al. 2005; Gheorghiu et al. 2009) clearly demonstrate 
the weakness of general trust in Japanese society relative to the United States. Collectivist 
societies are dependent on long-term dense social ties, in which individuals are assured by 
mutual surveillance that others will comply with social norms (i.e., guardian morals), strong 
in-group favouritism produces security within group boundaries but destroys general trust 
between people outside of them (Yamagishi 2011: 1-6).
     Weak general trust in collectivist societies needs to be compensated by ‘systemic support’, 
which originally meant government and bank support for financially strained financial 
institutions and companies in the credit markets. After WWII, when large Japanese firms and 
financial institutions faced a financial crisis, most (particularly major manufacturers) were 
bailed out by creditor banks and the government (Kurosawa 2001, Gotoh 2014).4 The 
broadened definition of systemic support is dominant elites’ support and protection of 
subordinates in exchange for the latter’s loyalty and obedience, exemplified in Japan by broad-
ranging domestic social relations, such as the main bank system,5 lifetime employment, and 
long-term subcontracting between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and large firms 
(Gotoh and Sinclair 2017). Although systemic support can be witnessed in any country, in 
Japan it is much stronger and wider than in LMEs. Systemic support is closely linked with 
guardian morals.
     In terms of the ideational conflict among Japanese elites, the anti-free market camp consists 
of interventionist bureaucrats, conservative politicians, Keidanren, legal elites, banks and local 
Japanese credit rating agencies, whilst the market liberalisation camp is comprised of reformist 
bureaucrats and politicians, neoclassical economists, Doyukai, non-Japanese firms and 
American credit rating agencies. These two major industrial associations are key ideational 
platforms of their respective camps, displaying different types of corporate governance in Japan. 
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In May 2002, Keidanren absorbed Nikkeiren (the Japan Federation of Employers’ 
Associations), an industrial association specialised in management-labor relations. Many large 
Japanese firms are members of both Doyukai and Keidanren.6 Doyukai’s opinions and 
ideologies have changed drastically since its founding, partly because of its personal (rather 
than corporate) membership of business leaders, unlike Keidanren’s corporate membership. 
Over the last seven decades, Doyukai has advanced pro-American positions and has been 
affected by US ideologies, starting with broad-ranging Marxist thought, including the New 
Dealers immediately after WWII, and neoliberalism since the 1980s (Okazaki et al. 1996).
     Keidanren’s predecessor was Juuyou Sangyo Tousei Dantai Kyogikai (the Important 
Industry Control Council), an umbrella organization of ‘control associations’ that assisted the 
government in controlling procurement from key industries, boosted collaboration between 
related key industries and promoted key industries to form cartels during WWII. Therefore, 
Keidanren naturally inherited anti-free market ideas. As the largest industrial association, 
Keidanren has been centred on wide-ranging manufacturing industries with a large number of 
employees, which has made it difficult to change its ideational stance. In particular, the 
investment goods sector, including industries producing plant, machinery, equipment, raw 
materials (metals, chemicals, etc.) and civil engineering goods, which rapidly developed in the 
wartime-controlled economy, has been politically vocal and significantly influenced economic 
policy and credit allocation by the government and financial institutions in Japan (Matsutani 
2009: 111-3; Teranishi 2003: 202-8). Keidanren (including the export sector) asked the 
government for trade liberalisation, the lifting of small retail store protection, and the 
deregulation of temporary staffing at the expense of outgroup members (e.g., farmers, SMEs, 
and non-regular workers). Keidanren’s underlying norms, however, which are reflected in the 
protection of regular workers and the opposition to free capital mobility, are anti-free market.
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Growing influence of Doyukai
Doyukai’s transformation from stakeholder capitalism to shareholder capitalism was made 
clear in the key-note address, entitled ‘Determination to Restructure Japan: Setting Global 
Perspective, Market Functions and Creative Management as Parameters’ (Okazaki et al. 1996), 
given by Doyukai’s chairman (1991-5) Masaru Hayami (Chairman of Nissho Iwai), at its 
annual meeting in April 1993, after the bursting of the bubble economy (1991-3) and the LDP’s 
money politics scandals, leading to its defeat in the July 1993 House of Representatives election. 
The malfunctioning of the 1940 system was a catalyst in making market liberals more 
influential within Doyukai, resulting in its ideational change. Hayami insisted that Japanese-
style management, the effectiveness of which depended on a high economic growth 
environment and social uniformity, had reached a dead end and needed to be restructured. 
Hayami’s proposal included deregulation in the retail, real estate, healthcare, food, financial, 
transportation, utilities, information and telecommunications industries, the development of 
new social infrastructure regarding R&D, and information and telecommunications and 
cultivation of a flexible labour market.
     Jiro Ushio, Doyukai’s chairman (1995-9) who followed after Hayami, pushed the 
association’s neoliberal orientation one step further. Ushio had obtained a postgraduate degree 
in political science from the University of California, Berkeley in 1957 and founded Ushio 
Electric, a manufacturer of lamps and lighting systems, in 1964. Given its relatively small 
corporate size, Ushio Electric was not a major actor within Keidanren, whilst Ushio has long 
been recognised as a liberal leader of Doyukai. He was involved in the privatization of Japan 
National Railways, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation and Japan Tobacco under 
the Nakasone administration (1982-7) as well as the further deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry.
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     After the bubble economy ended, Doyukai nominated four market liberals to be its vice-
chairmen: Yotaro Kobayashi (chairman of Fuji Xerox), Yoshihiko Miyauchi (chairman of Orix 
Corporation, the largest leasing company in Japan), Takeo Shiina (chairman of IBM Japan) 
and Yuzaburo Mogi (CEO of Kikkoman), all of whom had experienced American university 
education and were ideationally close to Hayami and Ushio.7 These nominations made Doyukai 
clearly neoliberal-oriented, and coincided with an epochal political event, i.e., the fall of the 
LDP and the birth of the Hosokawa administration (1993-4). The LDP administration failed to 
address public concerns over corruption, and the LDP lost power following the 1993 general 
election, which also caused significant turmoil in terms of political parties splitting, forming 
and merging. Prime minister and leader of the reformist Japan New Party, Morihiro Hosokawa, 
formed a non-LDP coalition of eight parties, and his administration focused on deregulation 
and the election law amendment to prevent political corruption (Tiberghien 2007: 109; 
Rosenbluth and Thies 2010: 99-101). Because of the growing trade deficit in favour of Japan, 
the US government demanded Japan open its markets and change its economic structure from 
export-led to domestic demand-led through the Structural Impediments Initiative of 1989-90 
and the US-Japan Comprehensive Economic Council of 1993. 
     Ryutaro Hashimoto (prime minister 1996-8) was known as a conservative politician, but 
when he became prime minister, his LDP faced public criticism over its political scandals and 
the financial sector’s bad debt problem. The LDP also had to compete against the New Frontier 
Party advocating neoliberal reform of the Japanese system and the New Party Sakigake 
proposing a departure from the bureaucracy-led system. Hashimoto set up the Administrative 
Reform Council under the Cabinet Office and chaired the council in order to tackle six major 
reforms in the areas of administration, fiscal structure, the financial system, social security, 
economic structure and education. Hashimoto had to appeal to the public by implementing 
major reforms in order to regain the LDP’s lost ground (Toya 2006: 174-5). Core members 
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(mainly manufacturers) of the industrial associations were generally supportive of financial 
deregulation because they believed that unlike the world leading Japanese manufacturing sector, 
the Japanese financial sector lagged behind global progress due to excessive government 
protection (Kawakita 2011: 139-40). At that time, few large Japanese companies fully 
understood the kind of impact financial deregulation would have (Shima 2006: 124-6). 
     The Deregulation Committee was established as part of Hashimoto’s Administrative 
Reforms in 1996, and Miyauchi chaired the committee on Doyukai’s recommendation. He 
believed strongly that bureaucratic authorization, control and regulation were nothing more 
than obstacles to corporate and economic development (Kawakita 2011: 151-3). Miyauchi’s 
capitalist perspective was in stark contrast to that of most Japanese business executives, who 
were internally promoted administrators. The Deregulation Committee gradually expanded and 
was renamed the Council for Regulatory Reform under the Koizumi administration in 2001. 
Miyauchi maintained the chairmanship of the committee/council for an unusually long time, 
1996-2006, thanks to his close relations with Prime Minister Koizumi, although he was 
criticized for his political position and ties, which were seen as contributing to Orix’s expansion 
(Kawakita 2011: 151-2). During this period, the Council for Regulatory Reform included 
Doyukai members, potential beneficiaries of deregulation, from temporary staffing, financial 
services and property development industries, and scholars close to Doyukai.8
     I argue that Doyukai’s political influence was at its peak when Ushio served as one of the 
four private sector members on the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy under the Koizumi 
administration from 2001 until 2006. Koizumi was not in the LDP mainstream, which 
advocated systemic support. He encountered public distrust of politics and the lengthy 
economic slump and made ‘structural reform’ his political slogan (Kamikawa 2010: 1-10). 
Prime Minister Koizumi rolled out extensive economic reforms, such as deregulation in the 
financial, telecommunication and retail sectors, a reduction in public work, and the October 
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2005 privatization of the postal savings system and the highway building authority. Whilst the 
average income of workers substantially declined from the late 1990s onwards, many regular 
workers in the private sector regarded public servants, bankers, farmers and small- and 
medium-sized retail store owners as vested interest groups. At first, many of these workers 
considered themselves to have nothing to do with vested interests and supported the neoliberal 
reform, but they subsequently realized that their jobs were also protected by the old 
employment practices and regulations and that further market liberalisation could place their 
jobs in jeopardy (Ikeo 2003: 8-11).
     Koizumi made the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy his most important policy-
making arena. He chaired the council of 10 other members – five ministers, including the 
Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy (Heizo Takenaka), the central bank governor 
and four private sector members, Ushio, Hiroshi Okuda (chairman of Toyota Motor and 
Keidanren’s chairman 2002-6), and two neoclassical economists (Masaaki Homma and Hiroshi 
Yoshikawa). Takenaka learned supply-side economics (a variant of neoliberal economics) at 
Harvard University in the early 1980s, and in 1987, Homma invited him to become an associate 
professor of economics at Osaka University; Yoshikawa belonged to the same department. 
Takenaka was a linchpin of Koizumi’s neoliberal restructuring, and his perspective was close 
to that of Ushio and Homma. 
     It is important to note that Ushio invited Takenaka onto the policy proposal taskforce in 
2000, which consisted of business leaders and economists, and led to the Koizumi reform 
(Asahi Shimbun 2008). The taskforce included Miyauchi, Homma and Naohiro Yashiro (a 
neoliberal economist) and held meetings with key LDP politicians, such as Koizumi and 
Yoshiro Mori (prime minister 2000-1). Core members of Doyukai advanced neoliberal policy 
proposals, including fiscal consolidation, bad debt disposal, deregulation, tax reforms and 
privatization, to LDP politicians by utilizing neoliberal economists who were ambitious to 
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expand their sphere of influence beyond the academic community as policy promoters. 
Although they were not publicly elected politicians, they could exert an unprecedented level of 
power into the political arena as private sector actors through both the Council on Economic 
and Fiscal Policy and the Council for Regulatory Reform during the Koizumi administration. 
Stakeholder capitalism vs. shareholder capitalism
The ideational differences between Keidanren and Doyukai from the mid-1990s until the mid-
2000s are remarkable and can be categorized as follows: 1) administrators vs. 
entrepreneurs/capitalists, 2) collectivist perspectives vs. individualist perspectives, 3) 
stakeholder capitalism vs. shareholder capitalism, 4) anti-free market vs. market liberalism, 5) 
supporters of guardian morals vs. commercial morals, and 6) proponents vs. opponents of 
systemic support.  The first example of ideational contestation between Keidanren and Doyukai 
can be observed in the so-called ‘Imai-Miyauchi controversy’ in February 1994. This 
controversy, between Takashi Imai (president of Nippon Steel) and Miyauchi, took place in a 
Doyukai study group. Although Imai was one of Doyukai’s vice chairmen, Nippon Steel was 
a key member of Keidanren and Imai’s management philosophy was similar to that of most of 
Keidanren’s core members (Kawakita 2011: 227-9). Asahi Shimbun (2009: 2-3) delineates the 
dispute as follows:
Miyauchi asserted that, ‘the most important thing for the company is the extent to 
which it can reward its shareholders. Corporate management does not have to 
consider how employment and the state should be’. Imai replied, ‘if you really think 
so, you are a traitor to our country. We have not run our firms for that purpose’. 
Yoshikazu Hanawa, vice president of Nissan Motor, supported Imai and insisted 
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that, ‘if lifetime employment is terminated, top management would have to take 
responsibility and resign first’. Then, Ushio backed up Miyauchi and contended 
that ‘lifetime employment and seniority wage systems will no longer be sustainable 
given our inverted population pyramid and aging society’.
I argue that Imai’s perspective demonstrates Keidanren’s stakeholder capitalism stance, which 
considers the rights of all stakeholders, including employees, shareholders, creditors, clients 
and suppliers, whilst Miyauchi’s reflects Doyukai’s shareholder capitalism stance, claiming 
that job cuts are necessary to enhance shareholder value. Moreover, the backgrounds for anti-
free market elites and market liberal elites were strikingly different. Both Imai and Hanawa 
were internally promoted administrators of manufacturing establishments at the centre of 
traditional elite networks binding bureaucracy, big business and the LDP, whereas Ushio, 
Miyauchi and Shiina were a corporate founder, a de facto founder and the head of a major 
American company’s subsidiary, respectively. By contrast, just like Nippon Steel (currently 
Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal), Nissan pursued stakeholder capitalism before its alliance 
with Renault. Facing a financial crisis, Nissan shifted from stakeholder capitalism to 
shareholder capitalism when Renault acquired a 36.8% stake a d Ghosn took over its helm in 
1999. This is a rare example of drastic corporate governance transformation in Japan 
(Tiberghien 2007: 187-90; Garside 2012: 183).
     Most executives of core Keidanren members, who are administrators, are fundamentally at 
odds with shareholder capitalism, which denounces systemic support. This is because 
unrestricted capitalist power jeopardizes not only the lifetime employment of regular workers, 
their subordinate allies, but also their own autonomy from capitalists, both of which are 
protected by systemic support. Administrators tend to prefer less demanding providers of both 
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debt and equity capital, such as local financial institutions and members of the same corporate 
group (whose management can be viewed as administrators), to capitalists. On the other hand, 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, who are less constrained by social ties, such as core Doyukai 
members, are frustrated with the vested interests within Japanese society and the inefficiency 
(lower investment return) of stakeholder capitalism.
     There was also an indirect disagreement over job cuts between Okuda and Miyauchi, which 
they expressed in separate interviews for the October 1999 issue of Bungeishunju, a monthly 
magazine. Okuda asserted that if management discharged regular employees, they should 
commit hara-kiri (i.e., resign), while Miyauchi warned that protecting employment desperately 
would result in a Titanic-like disaster, and stressed that companies should prioritize profit over 
employment.      
     In the 1990s, Japanese firms with lifetime employment encountered a very heavy personnel 
cost burden due to the rapid appreciation of the yen against other major currencies. Furthermore, 
due to the enhanced international capital mobility, advanced industrial countries (including 
Japan) made massive investment in non-Japan Asia, which accelerated the development of the 
latter. Accordingly, Japanese firms encountered tougher competition with those of other lower-
wage Asian countries. In 1995, Nikkeiren proposed a reorganization of the corporate 
employment system into three tracks: 1) a core group of long-term employees, 2) a group of 
specialists dealing with specific tasks, and 3) a group of part-time and fixed-term contract 
workers (Keizer 2010: 53). Takeo Naruse (2014), former executive director of Nikkeiren, 
comments that the main purpose of this reorganization was to reduce personnel costs as it was 
impossible for the industrial association to propose drastic pay cuts for regular workers, but 
that he could not expect the proportion of non-regular workers to entire labour to reach the 
current level (approximately 40%).
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      The second example of the contrasting stances between the two industrial associations was 
seen when the Temporary Staffing Services Act was revised in 1999. This revision lifted the 
restriction on temporary staffing for any industry except for specified businesses, such as 
manufacturing, medical, security and construction. Although both Keidanren and Doyukai had 
asked the government to deregulate temporary staffing services, their positions and goals 
differed. Keidanren’s deregulation stance was cautious and reactive, and its primary objective 
for deregulation was to protect existing regular workers under lifetime employment by hiring 
cheap, easily dischargeable non-regular workers instead of hiring new regular workers. 
Keidanren and Nikkeiren sought ‘to avoid challenging the lifetime employment system head-
on but to expand the range of jobs that employers could fill with workers hired under much 
more flexible arrangements’ (Schoppa 2006: 118). Thus, administrators are obligated to 
provide systemic support for regular workers but not for non-regular workers. In contrast to 
Keidanren’s ‘employment dualisation’ strategy, Doyukai preferred the deregulation of not only 
non-regular employment but also regular employment.  
     In 2002, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy gave top priority to labour flexibility, 
while the Council for Regulatory Reform also considered Japan’s rigid employment security 
in need of drastic deregulation (Yun 2015: 479-80). Both councils were led by core Doyukai 
members (Ushio and Miyauchi) and neoclassical economists at that time. The labour market 
deregulation was not driven mainly by Keidanren but by Doyukai. However, the twist was that 
Keidanren exploited non-regular workers in order to protect existing regular workers (Yun 
2015: 485). Particularly, low-profit companies, which relied on systemic support, tried to 
survive by reducing personnel costs.   
     The third example of Keidanren’s and Doyukai’s contrasting stances was witnessed during 
the Koizumi administration. Ushio believed that structural reforms would result in higher 
economic growth (Asahi Shimbun 2009: 220-1) and the core members of Doyukai backed the 
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administration. However, Keidanren and Nikkeiren held that the structural reforms 
implemented during the recession after the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, were too 
painful for companies. Indeed, in August 2001, Nikkeiren requested an ‘urgent employment 
support program’ amounting to ¥1 trillion from the Koizumi administration, which was the 
first task of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (Kikuchi 2005: 267-8). Keidanren also 
wanted the Koizumi administration to prioritize anti-deflationary measures to reinvigorate the 
economy, such as reforms in corporate tax and land-related tax, rebalancing between gift and 
inheritance taxes and manoeuvres to boost stock prices over a rapid clean-up of bad debts 
(Schoppa 2006: 147). Both Keidanren and Nikkeiren asked the government for systemic 
support rather than neoliberal restructuring. Furthermore, as Vogel (2006: 56) claims, 
Keidanren’s support for deregulation was ‘more reluctant than proactive, more formalistic than 
substantive, and more selective than comprehensive’.
     Yotaro Kobayashi, Doyukai’s chairman (1999-2003), emphasized at the association’s 2001 
annual meeting that Japan’s political leaders must deliver the following message to the nation 
despite its unpopularity with the people: although the final disposal of non-performing loans 
and corporate restructuring would make the recession temporarily unavoidable, the nation 
would be able to recover to steady positive economic growth after these structural reforms 
(Doyukai 2001). In addition, Doyukai was proactive in introducing mark-to-market accounting 
(under which an asset or liability is valued based on the current market price) and impairment 
accounting (under which the difference in fixed assets between the fair value and the book 
value is written down) to improve the transparency of financial statements: Keidanren resisted 
the change. In April 2003, Kakutaro Kitashiro, chairman of Doyukai (2003-7) and Japan IBM, 
commented that although some politicians had tried to postpone or suspend the introduction of 
mark-to-market and impairment accounting because of the share price slump at the end of 
March, such manipulation would not change the actual corporate performance (Doyukai 2003). 
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In contrast, Mitsuo Horiuchi (the LDP’s chairman, General Council) and Tetsuya Katada (vice-
chairman of Keidanren) had discussed the postponement of the introduction of impairment 
accounting, which would realize latent losses held by many firms (Asahi Shimbun 2003).
     From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, Japanese society’s loss of confidence in the 
economic and business spheres was intertwined with its awe of the United States, which created 
the sense that Japan should follow American standards (Ito 2007: 155-6). This atmosphere 
peaked during the Koizumi administration, the first half of which witnessed several major 
bankruptcies, which indicated weakening systemic support. The financial deregulation, the 
heightened recognition of credit risk and the weakened credit extension by the banking sector 
accelerated the rapid expansion of new debt business, including bad debt trading, securitization 
(asset-backed securities) and credit derivatives in Japan, which were developed in the United 
States during the 1980s and 1990s, and sharply expanded the Japan operations of both the 
American credit rating agencies and investment banks, taking advantage of their expertise 
(Shima 2006).
     Keidanren’s influence has relatively weakened since the 1990s, but its loss of status should 
not be exaggerated. During the Koizumi administration, Keidanren was defensive in contrast 
to the rising Doyukai, but worked to maintain Japanese-style stakeholder capitalism and waited 
for an opportunity to strike back. In June 2006, just before the end of the Koizumi 
administration, Keidanren published a proposal entitled ‘A Suitable Corporate Governance 
System for Japan’, which stresses three points (Keidanren 2006a). Firstly, companies should 
conduct management with an emphasis on corporate social responsibility, taking into 
consideration value creation for diversified stakeholders, such as shareholders, employees, 
clients and local communities, which will consequently enhance shareholder value. Secondly, 
corporate management is based on an individual society’s idiosyncratic culture, tradition, 
norms and business customs, and suitable corporate governance varies by company according 
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to the individual corporate philosophy, vision, culture, history, strategy and industry. Lastly, 
importing overseas corporate governance methods uniformly to Japan should be avoided 
because it would cause companies and other relevant parties an excessive burden in terms of 
business confusion and higher costs. This proposal also reflects Keidanren’s determination to 
maintain Japanese-style stakeholder capitalism, primarily based on an alliance between 
administrators and regular workers through the exchange of systemic support for obedience, 
leading to an anti-neoliberal position.  
Déjà vu? Backlash towards liberal global norms
In Japanese politics and economics, there has been a so-called ‘continuity-discontinuity debate 
over pre-war/wartime and post-war Japan’ (Muramatsu 1981: 7-11; Noguchi 2010: 13-9). The 
discontinuity camp, mainly neoclassical economists, claims that Japan transformed from a 
controlled economy during wartime (1936-45) to a liberal economy in the post-war period. In 
contrast, the continuity camp, including Noguchi (2010), emphasizes the continuity of anti-free 
market characteristics of the Japanese economic and corporate systems between the wartime 
and post-war periods. I share the continuity camp’s perspective. Japan’s liberal economic 
system from 1868 until the early 1930s was heavily influenced by the liberal world order of 
Pax Britannica. However, anti-liberal norms (exemplified by Confucianism) had been used by 
ruling elites to dominate subordinates in Japanese society since the feudal period. A dramatic 
increase in class conflicts (e.g., labour and agrarian disputes) in Japan from WWI (1914-8) 
until the mid-1930s reflected the tension between liberal global norms and anti-liberal Japanese 
social norms, promoting government intervention into the economy and ultimately leading to 
a controlled economy (Teranishi 2003: 143-7).
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     The restricted international capital mobility under the Bretton Woods system fitted well 
with Japanese society’s anti-liberal, anti-free market norms. The restrictive world financial 
order (i.e. the constraint of capitalist power) contributed to the continuity of the 1940 system 
and the dominance of anti-free market elites in Japan, despite Japanese growth. However, since 
American neoliberal hegemony increased international capital mobility after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods System and the end of the Cold War, the tension between liberal global norms 
and anti-liberal Japanese social norms have intensified. Although the power of anti-free market 
elites was challenged by market liberals from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, an anti-
neoliberal backlash started in 2006, which demonstrates the persistence of anti-liberal, anti-
free market Japanese social norms.
     The Koizumi administration, lacking a strong foundation within the LDP, had to rely on 
their popularity among voters, so they provided systemic support, such as the bailout of Resona 
Bank, the establishment of a government-sponsored corporate restructuring fund, and 
quantitative monetary easing in order to mitigate the social pain associated with structural 
reforms. This was the limitation of the neoliberal-oriented administration in Japan, which 
encountered very strong pressure from anti-free market social norms. At first, the public 
supported Koizumi because they believed that bureaucrats and industry groups wasted public 
money, causing a deteriorating budget deficit when the recession continued, and companies 
proceeded with restructuring (Kamikawa 2010: 311). Subsequently, the Koizumi 
administration encountered problems advancing reforms when criticism intensified over the 
structural reforms impact on widening income inequality (Kamikawa 2010: 311). However, 
importantly, both anti-free market elites and subordinates, such as regular workers and SME 
owners, feared rising capitalist power, and ultimately prevented it. Excessive cash stemming 
from quantitative monetary easing and financial deregulation contributed to speculative money 
games by aggressive investment funds and ambitious entrepreneurs in the Japanese financial 
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market during 2004-6. According to Yoshio Shima, anti-free market elites and workers with 
steadily declining wages were disgusted with funds and entrepreneurs making large profits.9 
Conservative corporate establishments despised entrepreneurs, particularly those in the 
information technology and non-banking sectors, as upstarts. Keidanren refused membership 
to major consumer credit companies until November 2002, when their business became much 
larger than a decade previously due to the financial deregulation (Mainichi Shimbun 2002).
     The strong anti-neoliberal sentiment was eloquently illustrated in heavy media criticism of 
the Livedoor and Murakami Fund incidents in 2006. Japanese prosecutors arrested Takafumi 
Horie, a young, audacious advocate of shareholder capitalism and the CEO of Livedoor (a 
rapidly booming information technology and financial group) in January 2006 on suspicion of 
securities law violations. Five months later, the Tokyo Stock Exchange delisted Livedoor due 
to false statements in its annual securities reports, while public prosecutors arrested Yoshiaki 
Murakami, a former reformist bureaucrat and the founder of the so-called Murakami Fund, a 
shareholder activist fund, for insider trading of Livedoor shares. Horie and Murakami were 
both unashamedly neoliberal elites and shared a close relationship. Livedoor rapidly expanded 
its market capitalization (which reached ¥930 billion in January 2004) through stock splits and 
serial acquisitions. The Murakami Fund purchased stakes of listed Japanese companies, and its 
total investment amount exceeded ¥440 billion as of the end of March 2006.
     Japanese prosecutors accused Horie of window-dressing Livedoor’s consolidated sales by 
including ¥5.3 billion of profits from the sale of its own shares held by the investment 
partnerships in which Livedoor invested. Compared with the continued listing of 
establishments, such as Olympus and Toshiba, which conducted much larger accounting 
frauds, the delisting of Livedoor might seem harsh. The relentless media criticism of both Horie 
and Murakami as immoral money worshipers and greedy neoliberals reinforced Japanese 
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society’s hatred and fear of shareholder capitalism. Motonari Otsuru, the new head of the 
special investigative squad of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors’ Office, who would later 
be in charge of the Livedoor case, made the following statement at his inaugural press 
conference in April 2005, which reflected the public’s disgust with Horie: ‘by all means, we 
would like to prosecute wrongdoing resented by hard working people, unemployed people due 
to job cuts, and business people who comply with laws although they recognise that they could 
make large profits if they breach laws’ (Suda 2006: 37). The judge on the Murakami Fund case 
at the Tokyo District Court made the following comment, which astonished even Yasuhito 
Omori (2007: 182), head of the Financial Markets Division of the Financial Services Agency 
(FSA): ‘Murakami’s extreme pursuit of profit above all else by buying low and selling high is 
appalling’. The two court cases suggest that legal elites in Japan shared anti-free market norms 
with other conservative elites. Severely punishing both Horie and Murakami could be regarded 
as a clear warning to other capitalists and entrepreneurs.
     These incidents enfeebled the power of market liberals, especially Doyukai because of 
Horie’s relationships with some members of the Koizumi administration, whereas Murakami 
had close ties with core members of Doyukai, such as Miyauchi and Ushio. In particular, Orix 
was a major sponsor of the Murakami Fund. The Koizumi administration encountered growing 
criticism over the structural reforms that had widened income inequality by generating large 
numbers of low-waged non-regular workers. Miyauchi stepped down from the chairmanship 
of the Council for Regulatory Reform, in step with Koizumi's resignation from the premiership 
in September 2006. According to the 2005 survey (with 1,320 respondents) on Japanese 
corporate governance by the University of Tokyo, 69.1% of respondents thought employee 
benefits should be prioritized over those of shareholders, while only 18.8% thought the other 
way around (Takahashi 2007).
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     From the summer of 2007, the global financial crisis further accelerated the anti-neoliberal 
trend and strong demand for systemic support in Japan. The sharp contraction of the Japanese 
securitization market on which many major non-banks depended, and the rising social criticism 
of non-banks’ harsh collection measures (threats and violence to borrowers and their 
guarantors) resulting in the revised Money Lending Law, forced numerous non-banks to either 
go bankrupt or be placed under bank umbrellas. These trends in the second half of the 2000s 
can be viewed as a de facto reversal of the financial liberalisation that contributed to the 
booming of the non-banks during the late 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. Furthermore, 
the global financial crisis gave Japanese anti-free market elites a great opportunity to denounce 
American-style shareholder capitalism. Takafumi Sato (2010: 70), former head of the FSA, 
points out that scepticism regarding the policy goal of strengthening the competitiveness of the 
Japanese capital market grew in 2009 due to the financial fiascos in the United States and 
Britain. Japanese society can no longer fully rely on the old regime, but their social norms mean 
that they cannot accept American-style market liberalism as an alternative. Importantly, 
systemic support has hindered the Japanese economy from shifting low growth to high growth 
industries.
     The extent of neoliberal restructuring in Japan and its negative social and economic impacts, 
such as growing economic inequality, deteriorated rural economies and weakened international 
competitiveness of Japanese manufacturers, were often exaggerated by left-wing media and 
commentators. As well as the market liberalisation camp, the anti-free market camp also 
contributed to the social and economic problems, and the latter frequently made neoliberalism 
the scapegoat for these problems. Anti-free market elites, including Keidanren, manoeuvred 
shrewdly in that they avoided direct confrontation with the Koizumi administration when it 
was popular, and they made the market liberalisation camp look solely responsible for the 
social and economic problems. The slow collapse of Japan’s convoy capitalism was due mainly 
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to the accumulated irresponsibility of anti-free market administrators, while these 
administrators, advocates of systemic support, have had to gradually reduce the number of 
regular workers and rapidly expand the number of non-regular workers.
     The Japanese economy has paid a heavy cost for not conforming to liberal global norms. 
Japanese manufacturers have coped with deteriorating international cost competitiveness due 
to the rapid appreciation of the yen by relocating production to other Asian countries and 
reducing the domestic workforce and wage. The mature industries in Japan have had to reduce 
their average wage due to the intense competition with those in emerging economies. On the 
other hand, Japan has failed to nurture many domestic entrepreneurs and to attract global talent 
and capital, resulting in the slow industrial upgrading, which offers only a limited number of 
high earning jobs. These factors have decreased the average household income in Japan, and 
the protection of existing regular workers has contributed to the rapid increase in the number 
of the working poor. Furthermore, the weak domestic demand and the diminished future 
economic prospects have increasingly made the Japanese corporate sector prioritise overseas 
investment over domestic investment. The proportion of Japan’s outstanding outward FDI to 
GDP has sharply risen, from 5.3% in 1996 to 30.7% (which is much higher than that of China 
at 12.3%) in 2017. The ‘hollowing-out’ is a major problem for the Japanese economy (Schoppa 
2006), although not associated with industrial upgrading due to the small amount of inward 
FDI unlike the US case (Hatch 2010: 199). Many large manufacturers belonging to Keidanren 
have faced great difficulty in retaining their domestic operations and employment (Hatch 2010: 
200).
     The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government (2009-12) tried to improve the working 
conditions of non-regular workers, but in vain. During the reign of the DPJ, Keidanren 
advocated the flexible use of non-regular workers as a source of cost reduction (Yun 2015: 
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488). According to the MHLW, the respective average wages for non-regular workers aged 30-
34, 40-44 and 50-54 were 24%, 37% and 48% lower than those of regular peers. The significant 
wage disparities are not based on work performance comparison, but rather, are decided by the 
hierarchical status of non-regular workers, who are subordinate to regular ones. Japanese 
enterprise unions do not organize non-regular employees working in the same workplace 
because of the special status enjoyed by regular employees (Suzuki 2010: 394). According to 
the MHLW (2017), non-regular workers are ineligible for membership at over 60% of all the 
Japanese labour unions, and only 12% of the unions discussed ‘equal pay for equal work’ 
(correction to wage disparities between regular and non-regular workers). These points indicate 
that the Japanese labour mark t is still dominated by guardian morals emphasizing loyalty, 
obedience and exclusiveness.
Persistent systemic support and in-group favouritism
Both systemic support and in-group favouritism, which sustain a management-labour alliance, 
are key components of guardian morals and indispensable to the corporate system at the centre 
of Japanese society. This is one major reason why systemic support has persisted, even when 
the power of the economic bureaucracy and the banking industry weakened from the mid-1990s 
to the early 2000s. The robustness of the Japanese-style corporate system can be explained 
partly by superiors and subordinates (for instance, management and regular workers, banks and 
corporate borrowers, and large firms and subcontractors) mutually abandoning their alternative 
options to long-term commitment. Should capitalists become dominant in Japanese corporate 
society, they would cut off long-term social ties and networks, such as the management-labour 
alliance and keiretsu, resulting in the loss of management’s autonomous power within their 
firms and stable employment. 
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     The prolonged economic stagnation, the financial deregulation, the financial crisis and the 
introduction of American-style financial and business practices (including corporate 
restructuring, mark-to-market accounting, financial disintermediation, and outside director and 
executive officer systems) have changed some elements of Japanese corporate governance, but 
these changes should not be exaggerated (Omura and Masuko 2003). An increasing number of 
large firms have faced difficulties in sustaining lifetime employment and seniority-based wages, 
and the number of non-regular workers has dramatically increased. Since the 1990s, banks and 
companies have been forced to unwind a large portion of cross-shareholdings due to the 
financial crisis, corporate restructuring and the introduction of both mark-to-market accounting 
and the restriction on shareholdings by banks, resulting in higher foreign ownership ratios of 
Japanese shares. However, despite the unwinding of mutual shareholdings, long-term keiretsu 
transactions and subcontracting are still ubiquitous in Japan. The outstanding Japanese 
corporate bonds increased during the 1990s but has moderately decreased since the early 2000s 
because of many Japanese corporate borrowers’ preference for loans from banks in long-term 
relationships over bonds held by ‘faceless’ investors, according to Tsuyoshi Oyama.10 This 
exemplifies the persistence of systemic support in Japan.
     Also, importantly, the core of Japanese corporate governance, in-group favouritism, has 
remained almost intact due to the persistence of systemic support. Noguchi (2010: 222-7) 
claims that almost all management at large Japanese firms, except for those that have gone 
bankrupt or faced a financial crisis, including Nissan Motor and Japan Airlines, are internally 
promoted, and that the Japanese-style company places top priority on the survival of its 
employee community-like organization and considers profit maximization a sin. Given the 
growing influence of overseas shareholders, listed Japanese firms have had to introduce 
American-style corporate governance practices in order to enhance or maintain their share 
prices and tap the capital market when necessary. However, most corporate executives of these 
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firms do not want overseas shareholders to interfere in management issues and wish to preserve 
their autonomy (Matsumoto 2010: 10-2; Nishiyama 1992: 246-7). Consequently, many of these 
firms have demonstrated mock or cosmetic convergence to American-style corporate 
governance, for instance, through their nominal introduction of outside board members and the 
executive officer system (Omura and Masuko 2003).
     Higher bankruptcy risk and shareholders’ demand for higher returns would change 
Japanese-style corporate governance based on the management-labour alliance. Although these 
factors would enhance the bargaining power of capitalists vis-à-vis management, persistent 
systemic support has prevented capitalist domination. In this respect, Japanese banks, which 
have provided systemic support for financially strained companies, do not belong to the 
capitalist camp. Choosing either stakeholder or shareholder capitalism is not simply a matter 
of right or wrong but rather a philosophical and normative question. Most importantly, their 
ultimate fault line is either to continue or to restrict strong systemic support. Industrial and 
corporate metabolism in Japan is much slower than in the United States due to less frequent 
major bankruptcies, resulting in the underperformance of the Japanese equity market (Fujita 
2015). 
      The low proportion of Japan’s outstanding inward FDI to GDP is due mainly to a relatively 
small number of foreign firms’ acquisitions of Japanese firms. Daiichi-Kangin Research 
Institute (1996) pointed out four main reasons.14 Firstly, Japanese corporate executives are 
reluctant to sell companies like goods because they have strong attachment to their companies 
and a sense of responsibility to their employees. Secondly, Japanese society has a negative 
view of the selling of companies, leading potentially to the loss of corporate and/or 
management credibility. Thirdly, corporate executives are concerned that selling a company 
will deprive them of their management positions, and their suppliers, client companies and core 
banks may oppose the sale. Lastly, Japanese companies are concerned about acquisition, 
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particularly by foreign companies, due to fears of drastic personnel cuts and having to 
communicate in foreign languages. These reasons suggest that guardian morals, such as strong 
in-group favouritism and exchange of systemic support for obedience and loyalty, in Japanese 
society are major obstacles to foreign firms’ takeover of Japanese firms.
     From 2001 until 2008, the US government sought market liberalisation in Japan, including 
the lifting of the ban on a ‘triangular merger’ (in which the acquirer establishes a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, which in turn merges with the selling entity), through the US-Japan Regulatory 
Reform and Competition Policy Initiative. In January 2003, the pro-American Koizumi 
administration announced the plan to double the outstanding inward FDI into Japan in five 
years. Keidanren indicated support for this plan in October 2005 probably because access to 
the US market was critically important for Japanese exporters. However, the largest industrial 
association insisted that the government should restrict foreign firms’ M&As of Japanese firms 
likely resulting in the impairment of the latter’s corporate value or shareholder rights, and the 
damage to national interests, such as technology outflow (Keidanren 2006b). Despite 
Keidanren’s opposition, the Japanese government lifted the ban on triangular mergers in 2007, 
but outstanding inward FDI into Japan has increased only modestly since then. This suggests 
anti-free market Japanese social norms to exclude outsiders rather than government regulation 
have resisted market liberalisation.
     Despite the pressure from neoliberalism, the systemic support for regular employees in 
Japan remains. On 29 June 2018, Japan’s Diet passed labour reform bills to establish mandatory 
caps on overtime hours to penalize violators but remove work hour limits and overtime 
payments for highly-paid professional workers. However, equal pay for equal work was not 
sufficiently discussed in the Diet. The Abe administration is aiming to raise the average 
minimum hourly wage in Japan from the current ¥848 to ¥1000 gradually (The Nikkei 2018). 
Keidanren indicates a cautious stance towards the minimum wage hike by commenting that 
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SMEs’ ability to pay higher wages needs to be considered (NHK 2017). Given that large 
Japanese firms utilise SMEs as subcontractors, higher wages at the latter will affect the 
former’s cost. In contrast, Doyukai advocates equal pay for equal work and substantial wage 
hikes, which will cause the exit of less productive companies from the market (Doyukai 2017).
Conclusion
Okimoto (1989: 31-2) focuses on the trade-off between efficiency and security. CMEs, 
including Japan, tend to prioritize security over market efficiency, which strongly affects their 
corporate governance. By contrast, corporate governance in LMEs is inclined to prioritize 
market efficiency over security. Security is associated with the orientation for guardian morals, 
while market efficiency is linked with that for commercial morals. Administrators are acutely 
aware that their authority requires the consent (loyalty and obedience) of their subordinates, 
and that once they leave their organizations they will lose their power. In this respect, Japanese 
companies are similar to territories and castles during the pre-modern period: company 
preservation is a top priority for administrators (guardians).
     Keidanren and Doyukai are key ideational platforms of their respective, anti-free market 
and market liberalisation camps, which represent different types of corporate governance in 
Japan. Keidanren has disseminated anti-liberal, anti-free market norms centred on systemic 
support to Japanese society and shared such norms with other anti-free market elites. A 
management-labour alliance against capitalists and interlocking business relations are the 
cornerstones of Japanese-style stakeholder capitalism. From the early 1990s until the mid-
2000s, Doyukai promoted American-style shareholder capitalism in Japanese society based on 
liberal global norms. However, the anti-neoliberal backlash driven by both the anti-free market 
camp and subordinates, which started in 2006, has weakened the influence of the market 
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liberalisation camp. The large differentials in wages and treatment between regular and non-
regular workers is evidence of Japanese society’s resistance to market liberalisation.
     I argue that the ideational conflict between the market liberalisation and anti-free market 
camps has been a moral dispute between liberal global norms and Japanese social norms. 
Making short-term profit in financial markets and severing long-term social ties (i.e. 
prioritizing individual goals over those of collectives) still tend to be regarded as morally wrong 
in Japan. Global norms are influential but not necessarily compatible with social norms in many 
countries. Persistent Japanese social norms, which prioritize security over efficiency, have 
resisted liberal global norms to maintain the dominance of administrators who provide support 
for subordinates in exchange for obedience despite a heavy economic toll. The resistance to 
liberal global norms can also be found in other Asian countries where industrial associations, 
such as the Federation of Korean Industries, All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, 
the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce, Taiwan, and the Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers, play an important role. For instance, the Federation of Korean 
Industries, similar to Keidanren, was strongly opposed to the Korean government’s reduction 
of policy loans with very low interest rates and government guarantees mainly to export 
industries in the 1980s (Thurbon 2016: 78). When varieties of capitalism are discussed, it is 
worthwhile to pay more attention to the political influence and ideational aspects of industrial 
associations.
Notes
1. MOF officials provided preferential treatment and confidential information for financial 
institutions in exchange for the benefit of wining and dining. This resulted in the arrest of 
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five MOF officials and the resignation of the finance minister and MOF administrative 
vice-minister and weakened the power of the MOF.
2. The term ‘administrators’ was used originally by van Wolferen.
3. Interview with Toshio Yamagishi, emeritus professor of social psychology at Hokkaido 
University, on November 20, 2015.
4. Examples of major corporate bailouts from 2000 onwards include Daiei (a retail chain), 
Sojitz (a general trading house), Mitsubishi Motors, Isuzu Motors, Orient Corporation (a 
non-bank), Sanyo Electric (an electronics manufacturer), Olympus (an optical equipment 
manufacturer), Tokyo Electric Power, Sharp (an electronics manufacturer), and Toshiba 
(an electronics manufacturer).
5. Under the main bank system, the bank having the closest relationship and usually the largest 
credit exposure with the corporate borrower is made responsible for monitoring the 
company as a main bank.
6. While Doyukai comprises approximately 1,400 top executives of some 950 corporations, 
Keidanren consists of about 1,350-member companies.
7. Kobayashi, Miyauchi, Shiina and Mogi obtained an MBA from the Wharton School of the 
University of Pennsylvania in 1958, an MBA from the University of Washington in 1960, 
a BS in mechanical engineering from Bucknell University in 1953 and an MBA from 
Columbia University in 1961.
8. For instance, from April 2001 to March 2003, the council included Tatsuo Hatta (professor 
of spatial information science at the University of Tokyo, who proposed the liberalisation 
of the electric power industry), Naohiro Yashiro (a neoliberal economist), Atsushi Seike 
(professor of economics at Keio University), Minoru Mori (CEO of Mori Building, a 
Doyukai member), Eiko Kono (Chairman and CEO of Recruit Corporation, a Doyukai 
member), Reiko Okutani (a Doyukai member, CEO of The R Co., Ltd. whose second 
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largest shareholder was Orix), Akinori Yonezawa (professor of computer science at the 
University of Tokyo, Okutani’s husband) and Rie Murayama (managing director of 
Goldman Sachs Japan).
9. Interview with Yoshio Shima, professor of management at Tamagawa University, on 
November 20, 2015.
10. Interview with Tsuyoshi Oyama, Partner, Centre for Risk Management Strategy, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, on October 1, 2014.
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